The recent financial woes of Greece and other nations have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt.
the need for a bailout.
Countries are very different than banks, of course. Nonetheless, there are meaningful ways to create debt resolution procedures for troubled nations. Perhaps the most notable is the concept of a sovereign debt restructuring mechanism (SDRM), originally proposed by scholars (including the author) and later refined by the IMF into a template for an international convention. The template was never adopted as a treaty, however, because of political opposition in the United States by the second Bush Administration. Although the basis of the Administration's opposition was not clearly articulated, it appeared to reflect the philosophical dogma that free-market solutions always ought to trump legislative ones.
The Holdout Problem and the Funding Problem
In the sovereign debt restructuring realm, however, free-market solutions are inadequate because of market failures-of which the two most important are the holdout problem and the funding problem. The holdout problem is that any given creditor has an incentive to strategically hold out from agreeing to a reasonable debt-restructuring plan, hoping that the imperative of others to settle will persuade them to allocate the holdout more than its fair share of the settlement or purchase the holdout's claim. 4 The funding problem is that a country is likely to need to borrow new money to pay critical expenses during the debt restructuring process but no lender is likely to be willing to lend such funds unless its right to repayment has priority over existing debt claims. Any effective SDRM would at least have to address these two problems.
Addressing the Holdout Problem
The holdout problem can be addressed by legislating, through international treaty, a form of "super-majority" voting on sovereign debt-restructuring plans, in which the vote by the overwhelming majority of similarly situated creditors can bind dissenting creditors. This is the tried-and-true method by which insolvency law, including Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the United States, successfully and equitably addresses the holdout problem in a corporate context and achieves consensual debt restructuring.
Because only similarly situated creditors can vote to bind dissenting creditors, and because any outcome of voting will bind all those creditors alike, the outcomes of votes should benefit the claims of holdouts and dissenters as much as the claims of the supermajority. 
Addressing the Funding Problem
For these reasons, I believe that an international convention, in which supermajority voting can bind all of a nation's creditors, is needed to solve the holdout problem. Such a convention also could address the funding problem by granting a first priority right of repayment to loans of new money made to enable a country to pay critical expenses during the debt restructuring process. Existing creditors can be protected by giving them the right to object to a new-money loan if its amount is too high or its terms are inappropriate. Existing creditors will also be further protected because a country that abuses new-money lending privileges will be unlikely to receive supermajority creditor approval for a debt-restructuring plan.
Consensus and Disputes
Once these two market failures have been addressed, the remainder of the sovereign debt restructuring process can be consensual. A consensual process would not undermine the rule of law, as would an attempt by a nation to impose a "haircut" on its bonds such as by unilaterally reducing the principal amount of the bonds or the rate of interest payable thereunder. Nor should a consensual restructuring increase borrowing costs for other nations. Indeed, a nation whose debt has been consensually restructured should itself be able to borrow new money at attractive rates. In the non-sovereign context, by analogy, lending rates to companies with consensually restructured debt are much lower than rates charged before the restructuring. Admittedly, the lower rates in part reflect that companies, after restructuring their debt, have a more conservative capital structure. After a consensual debt restructuring, however, new-money lenders are less likely to charge a risk premium reflecting uncertainty as to whether the debtor will again try to unilaterally reduce its debt.
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Nor would a sovereign debt restructuring process need to depend on the creation of a "bankruptcy" court or other costly institutional arbiter. Indeed, the experience of corporate debt restructuring in the United States under Chapter 11 confirms that the parties themselves do most of the negotiating. 15 There may nonetheless be circumstances when parties have disputes. I have suggested that a relatively low-cost and straightforward procedure already exists under international law for this purpose. 16 The
International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), an autonomous body created under the auspices of the World Bank, provides facilities for arbitration of investment disputes. 17 The ICSID arbitration procedure is well established, commonly used, and widely accepted, and it should be a useful model to the extent that a tribunal is needed to resolve sovereign debt restructuring disputes. 18 Others have similarly proposed creation of an international arbitral panel for this purpose. 19 
Conclusion
As finance becomes more intertwined, sovereign debt defaults will become even more likely to trigger larger systemic collapses. That, in turn, will make most nations too big to fail. Without an effective sovereign debt restructuring mechanism, defaulting nations will expect to-and in most cases, by necessity, almost certainly will-be bailed
